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 ABSTRACT 
This paper uses panel data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Malawi to examine the impacts of natural 
disasters on schooling investments, with a particular focus on the roles of ex-ante actions and ex-post 
responses. We find that the importance of ex-ante actions depends on disaster risks and the likelihood of 
public assistance, potentially creating substitution between the two actions. We find that higher future 
probabilities of disaster increase the likelihood of agents holding more human capital and/or livestock 
relative to land; this asset-portfolio effect is significant in disaster-prone areas. Our empirical results 
support the roles of both ex-ante and ex-post (public assistance) responses in coping with disasters, but 
we see interesting variations across countries. In Ethiopia, public assistance plays a more important role 
than ex-ante actions in mitigating the impact of shocks on child schooling. In contrast, Malawi 
households rely more on private ex-ante actions than on public assistance. The Bangladesh example 
shows that active roles are played by both ex-ante and ex-post actions. These observations are consistent 
with our findings on the relationship between ex-ante actions and disaster risks. Our results also show that 
among ex-ante actions, human capital accumulated in the household prior to disasters helps mitigate the 
negative effects of a disaster in both the short and long runs. 
Keywords: natural disasters, ex-ante actions, ex-post responses, human capital investment, 






1.  INTRODUCTION 
In low-income countries, it has been increasingly recognized that economic agents attempt to smooth 
consumption by managing risks associated with natural and social hazards, through both formal 
mechanisms and informal arrangements (for example, Townsend 1994, Rosenzweig 1988, and 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). In many low-income settings, where formal insurance and 
government support are limited, agents tend to rely on informal insurance (for example, remittances from 
relatives) to secure their livelihoods. For example, marriage arrangements with households in other 
villages may be used to diversify income risks among relatives (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989). These 
mechanisms can be quite effective in smoothing the impacts of idiosyncratic shocks; however, if the risks 
are aggregate or correlated across agents (for example, large-scale natural hazards), these strategies may 
be less useful because the risks cannot be pooled to offset each other.
1
When agents perceive that there is a high likelihood of a large-scale hazard in the near future, 
they must employ strategies that differ from the informal arrangements described above, since cross-
sectional diversification and pooling of such risks are difficult. In other words, the scope of insurance 
arrangements (either formal or informal) against large-scale natural disasters is quite limited (see, also, 
the review by Dercon 2002, Morduch 1999, and Skoufias 2003). Thus, instead of pooling risk across 
individuals or households, agents must reallocate resources intertemporarily.
  
2
The expected returns to investments will be affected by the likelihood of damages due to natural 
hazards, which can therefore determine investment behavior in the long run. Dercon and Christiaensen 
   
The relationship between natural hazards and investment behavior provides interesting insights. 
Most natural disasters damage physical capital; climatic disasters (for example, floods and droughts) 
damage crops on farmland, while earthquakes can suddenly destroy buildings and landscapes. The 
immediate loss of human capital is typically much smaller than that of physical capital, although the loss 
of human capital largely depends on the nature and magnitude of the event, as well as its suddenness and 
unexpectedness. Disaster impacts on human capital seem to be more gradual, due to potential 
repercussions from physical destruction and economic impacts. 
The above observations suggest the possibility of a poverty trap. Once a disaster destroys 
productive assets and public goods, the expected income in subsequent periods will be lower than that in 
the past. For example, when an earthquake destroys schools, human capital investments (and their 
quality) drop, decreasing the expected income in the future. This point clearly distinguishes between 
disasters and income fluctuations.  
Recent macroeconomic studies find that a high likelihood of natural hazards can increase 
economic growth in the long run (for example, Skidmore and Toya 2002, and Tol and Leek 1999). 
However, more careful studies on developing countries recently show that technology inflow, which is 
positively related to growth, increases with natural disasters only among wealthier countries (Crespo 
Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner 2008). Disasters also have negative impacts on growth in the short 
run, and such negative effects are larger if the country has low levels of human capital (Noy 2008). 
However, the prior studies only discuss the loss of physical and human capital due to disasters, and the 
impacts of post-disaster investments and capital inflow (reconstruction efforts) on economic growth. The 
impacts on ex-ante investment behavior have not previously been examined.  
                                                       
1 The effectiveness of informal insurance arrangements is limited by the correlation structure of risks and imperfect 
information on the actual realizations of shocks. The latter creates a limited commitment (self-enforcing) problem unless agents 
can reduce monitoring costs through strong personal ties (Ligon 1998; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 
1997). In correlated risks such as large-scale natural hazards, this problem is mitigated because agents can easily observe the 
states facing other agents, as the situation is opposed to indiosyncratic risks. In the case of highly correlated risks, however, 
agents cannot pool and cancel the shocks. 
2 Agents may also spatially diversify against risk through the migration of entire households or individual household 
members, as noted above. However, ‘the effectiveness of spatial diversification against risk is limited in the case of large-scale 




(2007) show that the high likelihood of harvest failure discourages the application of fertilizer in 
Ethiopian agriculture, causing inefficiency in production choices.  
If household activities go beyond agriculture, the implications of high disaster probabilities may 
encourage agents to transition to nonagricultural activities that require human capital. For example, if 
physical capital such as land (agriculture) is often exposed to natural hazards, agents will be better off 
investing in human capital, which is portable and less affected by natural hazards. Educated workers can 
find work in urban labor markets, which may be distant from the affected areas. Porter (2008) shows that 
hurricane risks increase education, and the effect is largest among the landless. The present study shows 
empirical results in a similar vein.  
Consistent with this, investments in financial capital and livestock are also more robust to natural 
hazards than land. Under certain conditions, agents increase precautionary savings with increased risks 
(Deaton 1991; Kimball 1990). Micro studies show that in the empirical setting, where formal financial 
intermediation is not available, the accumulation of livestock buffers income shocks, helping smooth 
consumption (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993).  
However, the importance of ex-ante actions such as investing in certain assets highly depends on 
how agents perceive actual risks, as well as their expectation of the likelihood of public assistance in the 
post-disaster period. The first point is analogous to asking whether or not we can assume stationarity in 
risk structure and the agent’s rational expectations in the risks. As these are empirical matters, it is 
challenging to identify the dynamics of the risk structure and the agent’s learning behavior and 
information set (for example, see Gine, Townsend, and Vickery 2007; Dercon and Christiaensen 2007). In 
our present analysis, we do not address the above issues, but instead simply use the empirical frequency 
of natural hazards (flood and/or drought) from our data set, and assume rational expectations and risk 
structure stationarity. Similarly, we assume that risk preference is homogeneous.
3
                                                       
3 Wealthy households may be less risk-averse than poor households. However, given an imperfect credit market, wealthy 
households can self-insure against risks by utilizing their assets, and therefore may make more risky choices compared to poor 
households. 
 Other things being 
equal, the importance of ex-ante actions should increase with the expected frequency of future natural 
hazards.  
When deciding on ex-ante actions, households face a potential trade-off between income 
augmentation and income-risk mitigation. For example, a large family may help diversify risks, but it may 
also decrease per-child investments in schooling. However, investments in education seem to achieve the 
above two goals by increasing income and reducing risk, although returns to schooling investments 
largely depend on the development of nonagricultural labor markets (including the possibility of 
migration).  
The relationship between ex-ante actions and ex-post responses is more delicate. Some ex-post 
responses, such as private transfers (for example, remittances and borrowing) are already incorporated in 
the decisionmaking on ex-ante actions. For example, educated laborers can migrate to urban sectors and 
subsequently remit money to their original household. Holding livestock enables agents to gain cash 
income by selling some of the animals and/or using them as collateral. For agents, a more exogenous 
element is the availability and accessibility of public assistance. Even if such ex-post assistance is 
available in the economy, its targeting efficiency is critical to determining the likelihood of aid receipt in 
affected areas and by agents therein (see, for example, Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004; Quisumbing 
2005a; and Quisumbing 2005b). If such public actions are taken quickly enough, they can create 
substitution between private actions (as a function of ex-ante actions) and public responses. Owens, 
Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2003), in investigating the trade-off between ex-post assistance and the ex-ante 
interventions that increase capital accumulation, show that (1) intensive agricultural extension services 
and the accumulation of trained oxen mitigate the reduction of net crop income during a drought, and (2) 
private and public transfers are substitutable. In the present empirical analysis, we use actual data on 
public assistance to investigate the likelihood of these aids affecting the role of ex-ante actions in human 




We investigate the impacts of flood and drought on child human capital formation using data 
from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Malawi. Our empirical analysis uses schooling investment, as measured 
by grade progression (change in grades), to examine this issue. As Ferreira and Schady (2008) 
summarize, aggregate shocks (for example, economic recession) can have two offsetting effects on 
schooling investments: a negative income effect, and a positive substitution (time allocation) effect.
4 
Large income losses may encourage a shift of resources from investments in child schooling to 
consumption smoothing. However, if the opportunity cost for schooling investment (that is, child wage) 
decreases, this creates an incentive to keep children in school. In theory, therefore, the impacts of disaster 
on schooling investment could be ambiguous. In the present study, our empirical strategy controls for 
area-fixed effects, in order to account for labor-market effects that uniformly affect households in a given 
area.
5
                                                       
4 For example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show the contrast between the two effects, using the International Crop Research 
Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics data from India. 
5 With village-fixed effects, we may underestimate the impacts of natural disasters, especially drought. 
 Furthermore, since we are examining the roles of ex-ante and ex-post actions in altering the impacts 
of disaster on human capital formation, we do not think that the above-described issue is a problem.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes a simple model that concisely 
summarizes our hypotheses on sequential decisionmaking, namely that the importance of ex-ante actions 
depends on the risk of future natural hazards (disasters) and the likelihood of public assistance. Section 3 
discusses our econometric framework, and Section 4 describes our data.  
Our empirical results, which are summarized in Section 5, show that the likelihood of holding 
more human capital and/or livestock relative to land is positively associated with the future probability of 
disaster. Interestingly, this asset-portfolio effect is significant in disaster-prone areas. Our results support 
the roles of both ex-ante and ex-post responses (public assistance) to disasters, but also show interesting 
variations across countries. In Ethiopia, public assistance plays a more important role than ex-ante actions 
in mitigating shocks on child schooling. In contrast, households in Malawi rely on private ex-ante actions, 
with the impact of public aid being largely insignificant. The Bangladesh example shows active roles of 
both ex-ante and ex-post actions. These observations are consistent with our finding on the relationship 
between ex-ante actions and disaster risks. Our results show that among ex-ante actions, human capital 
accumulated in the household prior to disasters helps mitigate the negative effects of disaster in both the 





2.  A SIMPLE MODEL 
In this section, we construct a simple model to clarify the intuition for the relationship between ex-ante 
and ex-post actions. The importance of ex-ante actions depends on the likelihood of an agent receiving 
external assistance, such as public emergency relief. If the targeting of public assistance is perfect, then 
households do not have to undertake ex-ante actions (for example, asset reallocation) to mitigate the 
adverse impacts of disasters.  
Here, we assume four sequential stages. In the first stage, agents decide on asset allocation based 
on the expectation of future disasters and possible public assistance that is conditional on actual disaster 
incidence. We assume that agents know the correct probability distribution of future disasters, even 
though they cannot predict actual future occurrences. Disaster can randomly occur in the second stage. In 
the third stage, the availability of public assistance is determined exogenously to agents. Therefore, events 
in the second and third stages are random to the agents. In the final stage, the agents act so as to mitigate 
disaster impacts based on the asset portfolio they pre-committed in the first stage.  
Let e ∈{0,z} denote the impact of disaster on income, with probability p(e = z) following the 
binomial distribution. If a disaster occurs, it reduces income by z. Conditional on the disaster incidence, 
agents can gain access to public assistance x with probability p(x|e). For simplicity, we assume that 
x∈{0,x
*} and z ≥ x
* > 0. In other words, even if agents receive public assistance, this assistance does not 
perfectly recover the income loss.  
In the first stage (period), agents allocate some portion of their asset K to means H (human 
capital), which is not directly productive (at least in the short run). Therefore, agents can use K - H for 
income-generating activities. For example, H can be migrants who work in towns distant from their 
original village, and are able to provide support to their original families in the case of a disaster. 
Allocating resources to H is analogous to purchasing insurance against future disaster risks. 
In the second stage, agents have risk-averse utility from consumption in the second period 
(second and third stages). Consumption is determined as K - H - e + x + t - ph, where t is private transfers 
and ph is the total cost for child schooling investment (h is the schooling investment and p is the unit 
price of the investment). At the end of the second period, agents receive financial returns to schooling 
investment R(h) and pay the costs of private transfers r(H)t. We assume that the human-capital return 
function R(h) is strictly increasing and concave, while r(H) is strictly decreasing and convex. Investment 
in child schooling has returns in the future, and the allocation of resources to human capital in the initial 
stage means that there is a lower unit cost for private transfer.  
Note that disasters can destroy production assets (such as land), thereby potentially lowering 
production levels in subsequent periods. The consequence of asset destruction differs from that of income 
fluctuation in the sense that asset destruction decreases the expected income in subsequent periods, 
potentially creating a poverty trap. In contrast, income fluctuations do not change the expected income. In 
the context of human capital accumulation, school destruction is regarded as particularly important. In our 
model, we do not capture the potential for a poverty trap, because we focus on the substitution between 
ex-ante actions and ex-post public responses.   
Agents have the following problem:  
  { } max ( ) max ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ,
H ts K H u K H e x t ph R h r H t dF e x β
,
 − + − −+ +− + − ,   ∫  
where β∈(0,1) is a discount factor. We solve this through backward induction. In the second period, 
agents know the realization of (e,x). Based on this information, they decide (t,h). In the first period, when 
they decide asset allocation H, agents incorporate schooling investments and private transfers as functions 
of disaster incidence and public assistance. In the above formulation, we ignore the time allocation of 
children between work and school.  
Our modeling strategy differs from that found in the consumption smoothing literature, in that we 




(asset portfolios) are taken by the parents’ generation. Human capital investment in children has financial 
returns, which increase household income. Therefore, the discount factor also reflects a degree of altruism 
to the children’s generation. 
At this stage, it is meaningful to compare the following different scenarios: (1) disaster without 
public assistance when e = z > 0 and x = 0; (2) disaster mitigated through public assistance when e = z > 0 
with x = x
*; and (3) no disaster when e = 0. We can rank income levels in the beginning of the second 
period; these levels depend on the probabilities of disaster occurrence and (conditional) public assistance. 
The income level is highest in case (3), followed by case (2) and case (1). In other words, the demand for 
private transfers is the largest in case (1), which also implies that the potential need for reserving human 
capital is the largest in this case. 
The first order conditions for child schooling s and private transfer t give pu′ = R′ and u′ = r(H), 
respectively. Here, the unit cost of private transfers, r(H), which decreases with human capital, 
determines the utility price for private transfer. Thus, when (e,x) are realized in stage two, a large H 
makes it easy to increase t (human capital H and private transfers t are positively related, other things 
being equal). The availability of private transfers increases investment in child schooling. 
In the first period, given the optimal behavior for (t,h), agents decide H with the expectations of 
disaster occurrence and public assistance. The first order condition for the first-period asset allocation 
gives 
() [ ] 1 [ ( )]
texH
H r Eu E u r H t ββ
∂ ,, ′ ′′
∂ −+ =+ + . 
With the Envelope condition, we obtain  
  ()( )1 r H Et e x H Eu ββ
′′ − ,, =+ . 
In other words, the marginal gain (reduction in the cost of private transfer) on the left-hand side is equal 
to the expected marginal cost (the production loss in the two periods, part of which depends on Eu′) on 
the right-hand side. Intuitively, we see that there is a trade-off between income and risk reduction, 
depending on the expected marginal utility and private transfer demand. By reducing H, the household 
increases its current income, but this increases the cost of private transfers (for example, borrowing), 
which may decrease the expected utility if a disaster occurs. Therefore, the optimal decision on H depends 




Note that H does not have to be narrowly defined. For example, a large household size allows 
agents to diversify and pool risks, enabling them to ensure post-disaster private transfers to smooth 
consumption. Holding livestock is also known to increase production and enhance income smoothing (for 
example, by selling bullocks when income drops, even though this decreases the next-period production).  
We summarize our results in the proposition below.  
(i) An increase in disaster probability increases the share of assets that promote post-disaster private 
transfers (for example, human capital).
7
                                                       
6 If p(e = z) is high and p(x|z) is low (that is, disaster is likely to occur but public assistance is small), Eu′ increases and H
* is 
larger (-r′(H) (becomes larger). If r″(H) is sufficiently large, the change in the right-hand side (Eu′) is small, and the left-hand 
side increases. In this case, agents will increase human capital in the initial stage. Good targeting, represented by higher p(x|z), 
will substitute for private transfers, thereby decreasing the proportion of total assets allocated to human capital. 
7 Note that private transfer t(e,x,H) is dependent on disaster occurrence, public assistance, and ex-ante asset allocation. In the 
empirical analysis, we do not directly use information on private transfers, but rather infer the effects from examining how ex-
ante assets alter the impact of disasters on child schooling investment.  
  
(ii) Good targeting of public assistance conditional on a disaster reduces the incentive to hold 
transferable assets and increases investment in child schooling.  
(iii) Disaster decreases schooling investment unless disaster is perfectly insured.  
 




3.  ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
Here, we describe the econometric framework to clarify testable hypotheses regarding ex-ante and ex-post 
actions. We use schooling progression (the number of years completed during the survey period) to 
investigate how disasters affect human capital formation in disaster-affected and -unaffected areas. As 
discussed more carefully in the next section, our analysis utilizes data from actual natural disaster 
occurrences: the 1998 flood in Bangladesh and 2001 droughts in Ethiopia and Malawi.  
Strictly speaking, the use of child schooling to measure disaster impacts may be problematic, 
since disasters may affect not only marginal utility (due to income reduction) but also the opportunity cost 
for schooling investment (by decreasing the labor-market wage). The former decreases schooling 
investment in order to smooth consumption over time. In contrast, the latter increases schooling 
investment; a decrease in wage reduces the opportunity costs of schooling and increases the incentive to 
allocate more time to schooling. However, many disasters differ from economic recessions. For example, 
floods can destroy school facilities, thereby disrupting normal school activities. Severe droughts (such as 
those analyzed in the Ethiopia and Malawi examples in this paper) can substantially decrease crop 
production and threatening food security and human survival; this increases the real necessity for children 
to earn incomes for their families. Hence, in the case of severe disasters such as those examined herein, it 
is likely that the income effect dominates over the substitution effect.  
The above observations suggest that disasters can cause a poverty trap by destroying productive 
assets and public goods (for example, schools) and lowering the income-generating capacity in 
subsequent periods. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the destruction of local public goods. 
In our empirical analysis, therefore, we estimate the aggregate effect of disasters on child schooling 
through both household-level-income reduction and asset destruction, as well as community-level 
destruction of public goods. 
We estimate the first-differenced equation for child schooling, which is the schooling progression 
equation where the dependent variable is the difference in grades between two points in time (this allows 
us to difference-out unobserved fixed components of the error terms). This is given as  
 
( 1) 1 2 0 3 1 ( 1)
kk
ijl t t jl jl jl jl ijl i i ijl t t
k
h D D a D m area age gender αβ β β ε ,+ ,+ ∆ = + + + + + + +∆ ∑   (1) 
where ∆hijl(t,t + 1) is change in grades from time t to t + 1 for child i in household j and village l, Djl is the 
disaster/exposure indicator or its continuous measure (for example, depth of water),  0
k
jl a  is pre-disaster 
asset of type k, mijl1 is is post-disaster public assistance, area is the area-fixed effect, agei denotes a set of 
age dummies we use to control for age-specific trends, genderi is a gender indicator (male or female) that 
controls for gender-specific trends, and ∆εijl(t,t + 1) is the differenced error term. In the above notations, we 
use time 0 and 1 for pre-disasters asset (before t) and post-disaster public assistance (before t + 1), 
respectively.  
We assume that 
  [ ]0 ijl t jl ED ε , = . 
In other words, the disaster is unexpected, so agents do not adjust schooling investment in t, and/or 
shocks to child schooling in t do not cause disasters. In theory, the perceived disaster probability could be 
correlated with pre-disaster asset allocation to the agent’s portfolio, which may include human capital 
investment in children. Although agents can estimate disaster probability that affects their behavior, the 
actual occurrence of disaster is unpredictable in a given year.  
It is also assumed that 
  0 11 [ ] [ ]0
k
ijl t jl ijl t ijl Ea E m εε , ,+ == . 
Pre-disaster assets and post-disaster public assistance are also uncorrelated with shocks to schooling 




other words, we assume that in the grade-level equations (both t and t + 1), the parameters are the same 
for assets (if there is no disaster), but the disaster introduces changes in the parameters during the post-
disaster period (this point is analogous to the way in which we estimate complementarity between new 
technology and schooling). Public assistance is provided only when the disaster affects the household. 
Finally, 
  1 [ ]0 ijl t jl ED ε ,+ = , 
implying that a disaster is observed in t + 1 and actions taken in t + 1 are conditioned on this information.  
Including area-fixed effects in the above specification may cause us to underestimate the impacts 
of the disaster if shocks are perfectly correlated within an area. However, there is a cost of not including 
area-fixed effects, since unobserved area-specific time-varying factors often jointly affect child schooling 
in the same area. For example, changes in school availability and local wage (due to increased labor 
demand in the local labor market) affect changes in human capital investments. Furthermore, the actual 
costs of flood and drought are not evenly distributed in an area.  
Note that the labor market (substitution) effect occurs over a relatively short time frame. During a 
natural disaster, the wage decreases due to the reduction of labor demand. However, it is also expected 
that the wage will eventually return to a normal level after the disaster. Therefore, if our panel data are 
collected over several years, we cannot capture the labor-market effect. We can only observe the total 
effect (that is, the income effect net of the substitution effect). 
To clarify our theoretical insight, we also estimate pre-disaster asset allocation equations using 
  01 2 Pr[ ] Pr[ ]
kk k k
jl l l jl l jl a D D K area αγ γ ξ
′ = + + ++,  (2) 
where Pr[Dl] is the estimated village-level disaster probability conditional on the information from t to 
t + 1, and Kjl is landholding of household j in village l. We focus on human capital and livestock 
allocation in the analysis. For human capital, we use the maximum level of schooling (years) achieved 
among the household members. If agents correctly perceive the future disaster probability, and pre-
disaster asset allocation is an effective strategy for mitigating potential disaster impacts, then agents 
should adjust their asset portfolios prior to the actual occurrence of disasters.  
To construct a measure of Pr[Dl], we first use time series data of disaster incidences at the 
household level. This first-stage estimate of disaster probability contains idiosyncratic errors, so we take 
the within-village average to average out the idiosyncratic errors.  
Comparison of equations (1) and (2) yields two integrated hypotheses on ex-ante actions and 
disaster impacts: first, if γ1 and/or γ2 are positive for k in equation (2), we should expect positive  2
k β  in 
equation (1) (that is, if some assets play a role in mitigating the impacts of disasters, agents will allocate 
more to those assets before the actual disaster occurs); and second, a higher future probability of disaster 





4.  DATA 
This section describes the data we use to test our hypotheses. The International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and local collaborators conducted panel household surveys in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and 
Malawi over periods that include the occurrence of major natural hazards such as floods and droughts.  
In Bangladesh, the initial survey round was fielded in late 1998, immediately after the onset of 
the 1998 flood. This first survey was followed by two subsequent rounds lasting until the middle of 1999 
(del Ninno et al. 2001). In 2004, a follow-up survey was conducted in April and May, coinciding with the 
season of the prior 1999 survey round (Quisumbing 2005a, 2005b).  
In Ethiopia, the panel data set builds on the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, which began in a 
small sample of villages in 1989 and was expanded to 15 villages in 1994. Several rounds were conducted 
before 1999. A large drought occurred in 2001, and was followed by a 2004 survey. Similarly, in Malawi, 
the initial survey round occurred in 2000, followed by the 2001 drought and a subsequent survey round in 
2004. Combining the panel data and the information on the natural disasters that occurred during the 
surveyed periods gives us an ideal setting to assess the impacts of natural disasters on human capital 
formation and the roles of ex-ante actions and ex-post responses.  
However, although we adopt the unique approach described in the previous sections, the exact 
timing of the natural hazards with respect to the surveys is critical to the interpretation of our empirical 
results. In Bangladesh, the 1998 flood was immediately followed by the initial survey round. Although 
the impact of the disaster was gradually realized after the flood, the initial round captured some short-
term impacts of flood exposure. The next two rounds, which were conducted within a year of the flood, 
captured dynamic changes in the short-term impacts. This issue is especially important in analyzing child 
anthropometry. However, we think that our measure of human capital investment (years of schooling 
completed) is fairly robust to idiosyncratic shocks, particularly the health and illness shocks that typically 
accompany floods. In the case of pre-flood assets, we address this potential issue by constructing the data 
to reflect the pre-flood situation.  
In contrast, the initial survey rounds in Ethiopia and Malawi were conducted before the 2001 
droughts. Thus, the information on child schooling does not contain the potentially confounding 
influences of the droughts (except the parts explained by ex-ante actions). However, potential problems 
arise from the interval between the 2001 droughts and the 2004 follow-up surveys. Given that the actual 
drought impacts on income would be expected to occur in 2001-2002, we may not capture the complete 
recovery process of human capital investment in the two-year period after the income impact (that is, 
from 2002-2004).  
Malawi had a large flood in 2001-2002 after the 2001 drought. However, our preliminary analysis 
indicates that the impacts of this flood were rather small compared to the drought impacts. Therefore, we 
focus our empirical analysis on the 2001 drought in Malawi. The abovementioned concern regarding the 
interval between the natural disaster and the follow-up survey remains relevant.  
Differences in the time structure of the hazards and the initial and follow-up rounds affect our 
interpretation of our empirical results. In the case of Bangladesh, we may underestimate the initial 
impacts on child human capital, since the first round was conducted immediately after the flood, and 
therefore contains some flood impacts. However, these data are ideal for capturing the dynamics of 
human capital recovery, which begins immediately after the flood. Furthermore, using the three rounds 
conducted over the first year post-flood, we can examine short-term changes in school attendance after 
the flood. Thus, the Bangladesh setting provides both long-term and short-term dimensions. In the cases 
of Ethiopia and Malawi, the interval between the droughts and the follow-up surveys was rather short, 
making this data set suitable for investigating the short-run impacts on human capital investment.  
The 2004 surveys conducted in the three countries contain retrospective information on past 
disasters, allowing us to examine the probability of disaster. This probability is defined as the empirical 
average of incidences in the period from the initial to final survey rounds. Therefore, this metric reflects 




that Ethiopia and Malawi experienced several droughts between the initial and follow-up rounds. In 
Bangladesh, however, the 1998 flood was the single and most devastating incident for many of the 
households in our sample.
8 The disaster distributions for the three countries are shown in Table 1.
9
Table 1. Estimates of future disaster probabilities 
 
  Number of incidences 
Country/disaster  None  One  Two  Three 
Bangladesh: flood  0  0.14  0.29   
  (453)  (323)  (7)   
Ethiopia: drought  0  0.20  0.40  0.60 
  (594)  (394)  (215)  (54) 
Malawi: drought  0  0.25  0.50  0.75 
  (389)  (228)  (101)  (36) 
Notes: Numbers of households are shown in parentheses. Probabilities are defined as the 
empirical average of disaster incidences (measured yearly) in the period between the 
initial and final survey rounds. 
In Bangladesh, we also use a flood exposure index that measures the severity of the flood (del 
Ninno et al. 2001). In this measure, households are classified into flood exposure categories as follows: 
no exposure, moderately exposed, severely exposed, and very severely exposed. Given that the 1998 
flood was the single and most severe disaster experienced by many of the households in the sample, it is 
appropriate to use this exposure measure rather than disaster frequency. In addition, the Bangladesh data 
provide some details on flood impacts, such as the depth of water, the number of days covered by water, 
repair costs, and the number of days household members were evacuated from their homes. The former 
two measures are objective, while the latter two could be endogenous. Repair costs are actual 
expenditures related to household decisions and asset holdings. The number of days evacuated is 
correlated with number of days submerged, but it also measures the length of time household members 
were able to stay safely away from the disaster, and is therefore higher among those who had sufficient 
resources to stay away from the flood (for example, by evacuating to other regions). Thus, while these 
measures principally capture disaster impacts, some care should be taken in their interpretation. 
                                                       
8 Floods are a normal part of the agricultural cycle in Bangladesh. However, the 1998 floods were exceptional for both their 
severity and their duration. Unlike normal floods, which cover large parts of the country for several days or weeks during July 
and August, the 1998 floods lasted until mid-September in many areas, covering more than two-thirds of the country and causing 
crop losses of over 2 million metric tons of rice (equal to 10.45 percent of target production in 1998/99) (del Ninno et al. 2001). 
9 Alternatively, we can use historical meteorological data to construct some measures of too-little and too-much rain. In this 
case, however, we must define drought and flood using rainfall thresholds. Our method of using actual drought (or flood) 
incidences between the initial and final rounds has the advantage that households did not know the future disaster incidences at 
the time of the initial round. Both actual incidences and the disaster probability are contained within the agent’s information set. 
Although historical data reduce the noise in our frequency estimates, our estimates are likely to have relatively large 




5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we summarize our empirical results on (1) disaster impacts on schooling progression, (2) 
ex-ante actions and ex-post public responses, and (3) pre-disaster asset allocation (ex-ante actions) and 
disaster risks. In the following analyses, we use the sample of children who were aged 6 to 12 in the 
initial rounds. 
Disaster Impacts and Pre-Disaster Assets 
Bangladesh 
For Bangladesh, we have panel data collected during three survey rounds conducted in 1998-1999, 
beginning immediately after the 1998 flood. The data set contains information on both the number of 
school days and number of days the child actually attended school. Therefore we can construct the 
proportion of days attended in rounds 1 to 3, and investigate changes in this proportion over the course of 
one year. Age and female dummies are included in all specifications. We use union-fixed effects
10
Table 2 shows our estimation results on the change in school attendance over a year using 
alternative flood exposure measures such as water depth, the number of days covered by water, repair 
cost, and the number of days evacuated from home.
 and 
age and female dummies to control for trend variations.  
11
In Columns 5 through 8 of Table 3b (Model 2), we disaggregate the household asset portfolios 
into four measures: the maximum education in the household (years of schooling), land size, household 
size, and livestock value. We find that, with the exception of the number of days evacuated, the studied 
flood measures all have significant and negative effects on school progression. In these cases, maximum 
education significantly mitigates the negative impacts. In two cases, we also find significant effects of 
household size and livestock. Therefore, although the flood negatively impacts schooling investments in 
 Columns 1 through 4 (Model 1) show that repair 
cost significantly reduces school attendance, but the effects of the other measures are insignificant. In 
Columns 5 through 8 (Model 2), we include interaction terms representing land size and the maximum 
education in the household, to take into account the possibility that households with higher levels of 
physical and human resources are better able to cushion the effects of the flood. In estimations with water 
depth, the number of days covered by water, and repair cost, we find that holding land helps to mitigate 
the negative impacts of the flood. In the specification using repair cost, we see that household education 
significantly mitigates flood impacts. The direct effect on school attendance is significantly negative only 
in the case of repair cost. Overall, this impact seems smaller among girls, and the effect is insignificant in 
many specifications.  
In Table 3a, we summarize our empirical results on school progression; this is measured by 
change in grades completed from 1998 to 2004, thereby capturing the long-term impacts of the 1998 
flood. We use four measures of the 1998 flood to separately assess the impacts. Our results show that the 
number of days evacuated from home has a significantly negative effect on change in grades. This is in 
contrast to a previous finding on the transition from preschool to school stages (Yamauchi, Yohannes, and 
Quisumbing 2009). 
Columns 1 through 4 in Table 3b include interactions with total asset value (Model 1). Consistent 
with the notion that households with more resources are better able to weather shocks, we see that asset 
holding helps to mitigate the negative impact of the 1998 flood on school progression (Columns 1 and 
2—water depth and the number of days water-covered), while the number of days evacuated from home 
significantly decreases school progression (Column 4). 
                                                       
10 Union is an administrative unit directly above village. 
11 Repair cost and the number of days evacuated from home are potentially endogenous, as they are correlated with 
schooling shocks and asset holding. In our preliminary analysis, we find that instrumenting these measures by water depth and 
the number of days covered by water did not significantly change the results. This is because we use the first-differenced 




the subsequent six years, households with more asset holdings are better able to mitigate the flood 
impacts overall. 
Table 2. Short-run effects of Bangladesh flood on school attendance 
Dependent: Change in proportion of days attended from round 1 to 3 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Model 1    Model 2 









Flood  -0.0125  -0.0004  -0.00002  -0.0006    -0.0170  -0.0011  -0.00006  -0.0009 
  (1.500)  (0.720)  (2.480)  (0.880)    (1.490)  (1.080)  (3.930)  (0.870) 
Flood × land            0.00009  2.29-E-06  1.55E-08  4.06E-07 
            (2.700)  (2.900)  (0.940)  (0.050) 
Flood × maximum education            -0.0001  0.00004  4.94E-06  0.00004 
            (0.110)  (0.420)  (3.270)  (0.490) 
Flood × female  0.0163  0.0002  0.00002  0.0013    0.0183  0.0002  0.00002  0.0013 
  (1.620)  (0.490)  (1.730)  (1.530)    (2.040)  (0.410)  (1.610)  (1.430) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  630  630  630  630    584  584  584  584 
Number of unions  21  21  21  21    21  21  21  21 
R-squared (within)  0.0226  0.0191  0.0431  0.0209    0.0370  0.0292  0.0713  0.0226 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with union clusters. Age and female 
dummies are included in all specifications. 
Table 3a.  Dynamic effects of Bangladesh flood on schooling progression 
Dependent: Change in grades from 1998 to 2004 
Flood variable  Depth  Days  Repair cost  Out of home 
Flood  -0.1352  -0.0005  -0.00007  -0.0164 
  (1.510)  (0.110)  (1.210)  (2.250) 
Flood × female  0.0777  0.0074  0.00006  0.0131 
  (1.140)  (1.530)  (1.410)  (1.250) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  489  489  489  489 
Number of unions  21  21  21  21 
R-squared (within)  0.0488  0.0474  0.0457  0.0591 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with 
union clusters. Age and female dummies are included in all specifications. 
Figure 1 shows flood impacts on schooling progression (based on the estimates in Columns 5 to 
7). We use the sample mean of water depth, the number of days covered by water, and repair cost to 
quantify the impacts. Case 1 shows direct effects (without assets). Although the estimated repair cost 
effect is relatively small, the water-depth and days-water-covered effects reduce schooling progression by 
nearly 0.6-0.7 year. In Case 2, where we assume that someone in the household has attained a maximum 
of eight years of education, our estimates suggest that the flood impact is substantially reduced. Case 3 
supposes a household size of 10 members to assess changes in the effect of the number of days covered 
by water. This effect is almost equivalent to the education effect seen in Case 2. Case 4 shows the effect 
of livestock holding on the effect of repair cost. Using the mean value of livestock, we confirm that the 




effectiveness of human capital accumulation (in both quality and quantity) and livestock holding for 
mitigating flood impacts on child schooling. 
Table 3b.  Dynamic effects of Bangladesh flood on schooling progression 
Dependent: Change in grade from 1998 to 2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Model 1    Model 2 









Flood  -0.1586  0.0015  -0.00006  -0.0141    -0.3359  -0.0271  -0.0005  0.0072 
  (1.790)  (0.310)  (0.910)  (2.490)    (3.820)  (3.450)  (3.260)  (0.260) 
Flood × asset  1.50E-06  3.71E-08  -2.50E-10  -1.01E-07           
  (2.940)  (1.870)  (0.680)  (0.620)           
Flood × maximum education            0.0263  0.0025  0.00004  0.0003 
            (2.560)  (4.070)  (3.040)  (0.180) 
Flood × land            0.0005  6.56E-06  -2.57E-07  -0.0002 
            (1.690)  (0.620)  (1.310)  (1.310) 
Flood × household size            0.0211  0.0014  0.00002  -0.0032 
            (1.130)  (1.870)  (1.260)  (0.950) 
Flood × livestock            -1.98E-06  2.77E-07  2.14E-08  -1.23E-06 
            (0.660)  (0.830)  (2.930)  (0.940) 
Flood × female  0.0892  0.0072  0.00007  0.0128    0.0406  0.0084  0.0001  0.0032 
  (1.300)  (1.480)  (2.290)  (1.240)    (0.640)  (1.890)  (2.250)  (0.400) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  489  489  489  489    458  458  458  458 
Number of unions  21  21  21  21    21  21  21  21 
R-squared (within)  0.0564  0.0508  0.0462  0.0595    0.0947  0.1080  0.0827  0.0801 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with union clusters. Age and female 
dummies are included in all specifications. 
Figure 1. Flood impacts in Bangladesh 
 
Next, we use the flood exposure measure constructed by the IFPRI team, wherein households are 
categorized as not exposed, or moderately, severely, and very-severely exposed (del Ninno et al. 2001). 




the tested parameters are insignificant. Columns 2 and 3 include interactions with household assets. 
Consistent with the above-described findings, we see that total asset value, maximum education, and 
household size (in the severely exposed case) significantly mitigate the adverse impacts of the 1998 flood. 
Table 4. Dynamic effects of Bangladeshi flood on schooling progression: Flood exposure measure 
  Dependent: Change in grade from 1998 to 2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Flood index 1  0.2411  0.1414  -0.6037 
  (0.560)  (0.310)  (0.720) 
Flood index 2  0.1049  -0.0438  -0.0444 
  (0.280)  (0.110)  (0.090) 
Flood index 3  -0.1241  -0.1950  -1.6021 
  (0.280)  (0.440)  (3.000) 
Flood index 1 × total asset    2.49E-06   
    (1.130)   
Flood index 2 × total asset    5.66E-06   
    (1.110)   
Flood index 3 × total asset    3.20E-06   
    (2.930)   
Flood index 1 × maximum education      0.1301 
      (2.820) 
Flood index 2 × maximum education      0.1321 
      (3.570) 
Flood index 3 × maximum education      0.0978 
      (1.950) 
Flood index 1 × land      0.0002 
      (0.240) 
Flood index 2 × land      -0.0004 
      (0.650) 
Flood index 3 × land      0.0017 
      (1.310) 
Flood index 1 × household size      0.0025 
      (0.020) 
Flood index 2 × household size      -0.0715 
      (1.010) 
Flood index 3 × household size      0.1396 
      (1.500) 
Flood index 1 × livestock      -9.20E06 
      (0.270) 
Flood index 2 × livestock      -0.00002 
      (1.210) 
Flood index 3 × livestock      -3.75E-06 
      (0.260) 
Flood index 1 × female  0.0081  -0.0625  0.0776 
  (0.020)  (0.170)  (0.210) 
Flood index 2 × female  -0.2688  -0.2655  -0.1639 
  (0.900)  (0.930)  (0.570) 
Flood index 3 × female  0.4349  0.4535  0.4869 
  (1.060)  (1.110)  (1.260) 
Village fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  492  492  468 
Number of villages  21  21  21 
R-squared (within)  0.0513  0.0596  0.1269 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with village clusters. Age and female 
dummies are included in all specifications. Flood indexes 1, 2, and 3 stand for moderate exposure, severe exposure, and very 




Figure 2 evaluates the impact of very-severe flood exposure on schooling progression (based on 
the estimates in Column 3). We use the same assumptions for Cases 2 and 3. The direct impact of very-
severe exposure is a schooling reduction of 1.5 years. Our simulation shows that a maximum education of 
eight years and a household size of 10 members substantially decrease the negative impacts of the flood. 
Figure 2. Impacts of very severe flood exposure in Bangladesh 2 
 
Ethiopia 
Table 5 summarizes our estimation results for grade progression in Ethiopia, where we use 1997 as the 
initial round and investigate the impact of the 2001 drought on child schooling.
12,13
In Column 3, as discussed above for the Bangladesh data, we use disaggregated measures of 
household assets, none of which are found to be significant. The Ethiopia survey includes information on 
distance to the nearest town, which we can use to test the market and institutional effects on the 
effectiveness of ex-ante actions.
 In all specifications, 
we include age and male dummies, and use region-fixed effects and age and male dummies to control for 
trends. 
First, Column 1 shows that the 2001 drought has a negative effect on school progression, but not 
to a statistically significant degree. Column 2 includes the interaction of the 2001 drought with total asset 
value. Interestingly, drought has a significant negative effect on grade progression (about 0.37 year 
reduction), but asset holdings significantly mitigate this drought impact. 
14
Figure 3 shows simulation results based on the estimates given in Column 4. Similar to the 
Bangladesh case (Figure 2), we find that a large family is more advantageous than higher education for 
 Interestingly, Column 4 shows that the effects of maximum education 
and household size (both capturing human capital) become significantly positive when the village is 
distant from the nearest town. This is also observed for livestock, although not to a statistically significant 
degree. These results suggest that human capital may play a more important role in mitigating disaster 
impacts in isolated villages. 
                                                       
12 The 1997 round is the fourth round of the full Ethiopian Rural Household Survey Sample (three rounds were fielded 
between 1994 and 1995, and a fifth round was fielded in 1999). In the analysis of dynamic human capital production, we also use 
information on child anthropometry from the fourth round (Yamauchi, Yohannes, and Quisumbing 2009). 
13 Due to a problem in the between-round matching of children from peasant association no. 7, we excluded this peasant 
association from the analysis. Therefore, a total of 14 peasant associations are examined.  




disaster mitigation in Ethiopia. This could be due to the fact that the schooling level is generally very low 
in the rural areas of this country, meaning that diversifying risk by having a large family may be more 
effective in mitigating the effect of droughts. 
Table 5. Dynamic effects of Ethiopian drought on schooling progression 
Dependent: Change in grade from 1998 to 2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Drought 2001  -0.1903  -0.3731  -0.3060  -0.4497 
  (0.950)  (1.860)  (1.200)  (2.240) 
× total asset    0.0007     
    (4.290)     
× maximum education      0.0157  -0.1462 
      (0.390)  (2.160) 
× maximum education × distance        0.0192 
        (2.490) 
× land      0.0500  0.3836 
      (0.250)  (1.890) 
× land × distance        -0.0461 
        (2.260) 
× household size      0.0020  0.1181 
      (0.050)  (4.880) 
× household size × distance        -0.0085 
        (3.050) 
× livestock      -0.00003  -0.0001 
      (1.270)  (1.380) 
× livestock × distance        0.00001 
        (1.960) 
× male  0.2690  0.2827  0.3053  0.3138 
  (0.760)  (0.810)  (0.950)  (1.040) 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  846  842  815  721 
Number of regions  6  6  6  6 
R-squared (within)  0.0456  0.0507  0.0494  0.0671 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with 
region clusters. Age and female dummies are included in all specifications. Distance is kilometers 
to the nearest town. 






For Malawi, we also use the 2001 drought to investigate the disaster impact on school progression. Since 
the drought was followed by a flood in 2001-2002, we also analyze the confounding effect. In all 
specifications, age and male dummies are included. Region-fixed effects and age and male dummies are 
used to control for trends.  
Table 6 shows our results for school progression in Malawi. Column 1 only includes the 2001 
drought indicator and its interaction with the male indicator, both of which are found to be insignificant. 
In Column 2, the total asset value is interacted with the drought indicator, and we see that household 
assets accumulated prior to the 2001 drought mitigate the negative impact of the drought, although the 
direct effect of the drought is not statistically significant (with a negative coefficient).  
Table 6. Dynamic effects of Malawian drought on schooling progression 
Dependent: Change in grade from 2000 to 2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Drought 2001  -0.0172  -0.1328  -1.0057  -1.1000 
  (0.130)  (0.980)  (4.440)  (7.500) 
× total asset    0.00002     
    (3.460)     
× maximum education      0.1107  0.1120 
      (6.160)  (5.070) 
× land      0.0082  0.0109 
      (0.190)  (0.240) 
× household size      0.0366  0.0373 
      (1.470)  (2.420) 
× livestock      -3.28E06  -2.90E06 
      (1.020)  (1.210) 
× male  -0.0540  -0.0683  -0.0707  0.0119 
  (0.300)  (0.410)  (0.410)  (0.060) 
Drought 2001 × flood 2001        0.5657 
        (0.980) 
Flood 2001        -0.2861 
        (1.510) 
× maximum education        -0.0104 
        (0.320) 
× land        0.0342 
        (0.410) 
× household size        0.0152 
        (0.140) 
× livestock        -6.26E06 
        (1.030) 
× male        0.3250 
        (2.600) 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  449  435  433  433 
Number of regions  4  4  4  4 
R-squared (within)  0.0520  0.0849  0.1176  0.1287 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with 
region clusters. Age and female dummies are included in all specifications. 
Column 3 includes the interactions with maximum education in the household, land size, 
household size, and livestock value. We find that the 2001 drought significantly decreases school 
progression (by nearly a year, which is more than twice the effect found in Ethiopia). Furthermore, we see 
that maximum education within the household significantly mitigates the negative impact of the drought. 
This finding is similar to those in Ethiopia and Bangladesh. In fact, junior high school completion (nine 




In Column 4, we include the 2001 flood indicator to examine its potential confounding effects, 
but the previous results remain robust. Furthermore, household size significantly mitigates the adverse 
impact of the 2001 drought. Thus, it appears that both quality (maximum education) and quantity 
(household size) work to mitigate the adverse impacts of the 2001 drought on school progression in 
Malawi. Finally, the 2001 flood had a weakly negative impact on schooling progression.  
Figure 4 quantifies the impacts of the drought on schooling progression (based on the estimates in 
Column 3). Case 1 shows that the direct effect (without assets) is a reduction of about one year. Cases 2 
and 3 suggest that education is more effective than a large family size for mitigating disaster effects in 
Malawi. This is contrary to our findings in Ethiopia, but consistent with those from Bangladesh. 
Figure 4. Drought impacts in Malawi 
 
Ex-Post Responses 
This section summarizes our findings on ex-post public assistance and ex-ante asset holdings. We focus 
on the effectiveness of ex-post public assistance and whether the possibility of receiving public assistance 
affects ex-ante actions taken by households.  
Table 7 reports our estimation results for Bangladesh, where we highlight three types of 
assistance: gratuitous relief (GR), vulnerable group feeding (VGF), and assistance from nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs). Our preliminary analysis shows that these three sources have large shares in the 
public assistance (see, also, Quisumbing 2005a). Columns 1 through 4 (Model 1) use disaggregated 
measures of flood exposure interacted with the total amounts for each type of public assistance given out 
in 1998-1999, and the household asset value. We find that VGF aid is the most effective in mitigating 
flood impacts (in three out of four cases), and the total asset value also significantly mitigates the impacts 
(in two cases). In Column 4, we further see that GR and NGO assistance mitigates flood impact. 
Columns 5 through 8 (Model 2) use a more disaggregated specification of household assets. We 
find that VGF aid significantly mitigates flood impact (in three out of four cases). Among the asset 
measures, maximum education and larger household size seem to effectively mitigate the disaster effects. 
However, land size and livestock appear to play only limited disaster-mitigation roles in Bangladesh. The 
above results show that the availability of effective public assistance does not substitute for ex-ante 
actions taken by households in Bangladesh; ex-post public actions and ex-ante private actions coexist, and 




Table 7. Dynamic effects of Bangladesh flood on schooling progression: Pre-flood assets and ex-post 
public assistance 
  Dependent: Change in grade from 1998 to 2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Model 1    Model 2 









Flood  -0.2347  -0.0035  -0.00002  -0.0318    -0.4001  -0.0323  -0.0005  0.0209 
  (2.170)  (0.660)  (0.240)  (5.670)    (4.440)  (4.480)  (2.760)  (0.650) 
Flood × GR  0.00005  -7.05E-06  -4.24E-08  0.00003    0.0001  9.95E-06  2.44E-07  0.00003 
  (0.370)  (0.930)  (0.230)  (2.990)    (1.000)  (1.160)  (0.680)  (1.390) 
Flood × VGF  0.0001  8.04E-06  1.13E-07  0.00002    0.0002  7.98E-06  4.46E-08  0.00002 
  (1.800)  (2.150)  (1.540)  (4.090)    (1.780)  (2.130)  (0.710)  (4.370) 
Flood × NGO  0.0001  -2.72E-06  -2.50E-07  0.00002    0.0002  -1.78E-06  -5.98E-08  0.00006 
  (1.330)  (0.440)  (1.450)  (2.830)    (1.160)  (0.210)  (0.280)  (3.090) 
Flood × asset  1.77E-06  4.43E-08  -5.64E-10  -2.33E-07           
  (3.550)  (1.970)  (1.100)  (1.510)           
Flood × maximum education            0.0284  0.0026  0.00004  0.0007 
            (2.480)  (4.310)  (2.520)  (0.330) 
Flood × land            0.0006  0.00001  -2.55E-07  -0.00008 
            (1.950)  (0.890)  (1. 070)  (0.810) 
Flood × household size            0.0155  0.0015  0.00003  -0.0121 
            (0.730)  (1.780)  (1.040)  (2.630) 
Flood × livestock            -1.50E-06  3.46E-07  1.61E-08  -6.93E-07 
            (0.490)  (1.040)  (1.320)  (0.590) 
Flood × female  0.0831  0.0067  0.0001  0.0173    0.0320  0.0089  0.0001  0.0165 
  (1.310)  (1.400)  (3.160)  (2.320)    (0.560)  (1.910)  (1.970)  (2.790) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  489  489  489  489    458  458  458  458 
Number of unions  21  21  21  21    21  21  21  21 
R-squared (within)  0.0675  0.0618  0.0533  0.0865    0.1084  0.1191  0.0840  0.1069 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with union clusters. Age and female 
dummies are included in all specifications. GR, VGF, and NGO represent the sum of transfers received from the respective 
sources in 1998-1999. 
Interestingly, the flood impact is smaller among girls than boys. There seems to be some 
qualitative difference between genders in this regard, potentially because compared to girls, more boys 
may need to work outside the home to earn incomes during and after the flood disaster.  
In Figure 5, we simulate the flood impacts by assuming the sample mean of VGF receipt (in 
1998-1999) and a maximum education of eight years. The simulations use the estimates in Columns 5 and 
6. We find that public assistance only marginally mitigates the flood impact (Case 2), but human capital 
(measured by maximum education) appears more effective in mitigating the impact (Case 3). 
Table 8 shows our results using the data from Ethiopia and Malawi. Columns 1 through 3 
summarize our findings from the Ethiopian case. First, the 2001 drought has a significant negative effect 
on grade progression in all estimations. Second, the availability of public work programs (indicator) 
decreases school progression in the absence of drought, but increases school progression when drought 
hits the area.
15
                                                       
15 In this analysis, we do not control for endogeneity of program allocation except by differencing the schooling equations 
over time. Thus, as long as the initial period shock to schooling is uncorrelated with the allocation of public work programs, the 
estimate should be unbiased. Additional efforts to homogenize the sample using matching techniques are not adopted in this 
paper. 
 However, this result might have been caused by endogenous allocation of such a program 




adult members may tend to work in the programs, meaning that the demand for child labor in the 
household’s own production or domestic work may increase. 
Figure 5. Public assistance and ex-ante actions in Bangladesh 
 
Interestingly, we do not find any significant effect of household assets once we include the public 
assistance variables. Therefore, in Ethiopia, we conclude that public assistance is more important than 
private ex-ante actions for disaster mitigation.  
The results for Malawi are summarized in Columns 4 through 6 in Table 8. In contrast to the 
Ethiopian case, our results indicate that receipt of food aid plays only a small role in mitigating disaster 
impacts in Malawi. Instead, total asset value and maximum education significantly mitigate drought 
impacts in this country.  




Table 8.  Dynamic effects of drought on schooling progression in Ethiopia and Malawi: Pre-flood 
assets and ex-post public assistance 
  Dependent: Change in grade 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Ethiopia    Malawi 
Drought 2001  -0.2168  -0.4370  -0.2776    -0.1077  -0.2083  -1.1084 
  (1.100)  (2.520)  (0.890)    (0.600)  (1.050)  (3.840) 
Public work  -0.7253  -0.7673  -0.7563         
  (1.970)  (2.170)  (2.230)         
Food aid  0.2390  0.2638  0.3538    -0.1912  -0.1921  -0.2057 
  (0.850)  (0.980)  (0.980)    (1.430)  (1.340)  (1.380) 
Drought × public work  0.5498  0.6392  0.6143         
  (1.910)  (2.480)  (1.770)         
Drought × food aid  -0.5224  -0.4860  -0.6428    0.3554  0.3093  0.3824 
  (1.090)  (1.050)  (0.990)    (1.420)  (1.230)  (1.630) 
Drought × asset    0.0006        0.00002   
    (3.560)        (3.790)   
Drought × maximum education      0.0150        0.1112 
      (0.360)        (6.150) 
Drought × land      0.0539        0.0112 
      (0.290)        (0.280) 
Drought × household size      -0.0056        0.0354 
      (0.130)        (1.440) 
Drought × livestock      -0.00004        -3.70E06 
      (1.430)        (0.860) 
Drought × male  0.2390  0.2522  0.3020    -0.0627  -0.0786  -0.0744 
  (0.670)  (0.710)  (0.930)    (0.300)  (0.390)  (0.360) 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  842  838  813    447  433  431 
Number of regions  6  6  6    4  4  4 
R-squared (within)  0.0670  0.0724  0.0685    0.0553  0.0875  0.1214 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with region clusters. Age and gender 
dummies are included in all specifications. 
Next we check the robustness of our results by restricting our sample to areas that were very 
severely exposed to the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, or high-risk disaster areas in Ethiopia and Malawi 
(Table 9). High-risk areas are defined as areas having estimated probabilities of drought > 0.4 and 0.5, 
respectively, in Ethiopia and Malawi (see Table 1). Our results, which are summarized in Columns 1 to 4, 
support the above-described findings, and also prove that the effects of public assistance are greater than 
those shown in Table 8, indicating that the role of public assistance is larger in areas severely exposed to 
the flood.  
Columns 5 and 6 show our results for Ethiopia and Malawi, respectively. In Ethiopia, the 
negative direct and disaster-mitigating effects of public work are also confirmed in high-risk areas. 
However, the risk-mitigation effect is found to be larger than the direct negative effect, implying that 
there seems to be bias from the endogenous allocation of public work programs. However, this does not 
rule out a substitution effect among children.  
Interestingly, we obtain similar results for Malawi. The direct effect of food aid is negative, while 
food aid mitigates the adverse impacts of drought. However, the relatively small sample size in this data 
set prevents us from reaching a clear conclusion in this case.  




Table 9.  Robustness: High-risk and severely exposed areas 
  Dependent: Change in grade 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)    (6) 
  Bangladeshi flood    Ethiopian 
drought 
  Malawian 
drought  Disaster variable  Depth  Days  Repair  Out of home     
Sample  Very severely exposed    High-risk    High-risk 
Disaster  -0.4125  -0.0260  -0.0009  -0.0118    -1.2152    -2.2863 
  (2.350)  (2.420)  (2.510)  (0.310)    (1.790)    (29.47) 
Public work            -1.1361     
            (2.160)     
Food aid            -0.2049    -1.8825 
            (0.570)    (13.39) 
Disaster × GR  0.0003  0.00001  6.76E-07  0.00006         
  (1.950)  (1.330)  (0.630)  (3.500)         
Disaster × VGF  0.0003  0.00001  3.71E-07  0.00002         
  (5.800)  (2.940)  (1.280)  (2.380)         
Disaster × NGO  0.0004  0.00001  6.68E-07  0.00005         
  (2.740)  (0.860)  (0.870)  (1.260)         
Disaster × public work            1.6314     
            (3.960)     
Disaster × food aid            -0.0264    2.2333 
            (0.050)    (15.41) 
Disaster × maximum education  0.0227  0.0014  0.00005  0.0030    0.0085    0.1635 
  (1.760)  (1.500)  (2.230)  (1.740)    (0.550)    (3.520) 
Disaster × land  0.0012  0.00003  4.12E-07  -0.0001    -0.4038    -0.0094 
  (2.360)  (1.310)  (0.410)  (0.370)    (1.760)    (0.300) 
Disaster × household size  0.0044  0.0010  0.00003  -0.0115    -0.0128    0.0524 
  (0.180)  (0.700)  (2.990)  (1.590)    (0.270)    (1.040) 
Disaster × livestock  -5.82E-06  1.84E-07  5.64E-09  1.68E-06    0.00008    -0.00002 
  (0.960)  (0.650)  (0.160)  (0.990)    (1.530)    (1.450) 
Disaster × female  0.0955  0.0130  -0.00008  0.0338         
  (0.650)  (0.720)  (0.600)  (3.610)         
Disaster × male            0.5068    0.3377 
            (0.640)    (0.700) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes         
Region fixed effects            Yes    Yes 
Number of observations  121  121  121  121    168    96 
Number of unions  17  17  17  17         
Number of regions            5    4 
R-squared (within)  0.2926  0.2066  0.1640  0.1974    0.1655    0.3048 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values obtained using robust standard errors with union clusters. Age and female 
(or male) dummies are included in all specification. GR, VGF, and NGO are the sum of transfers received from these sources in 
1998-1999. The severely exposed sample is used in the Bangladeshi analysis. In the Ethiopian and Malawian data sets, the high-
risk samples are defined as areas having drought probabilities > 0.40 and 0.50, respectively (see Table 1). 
Risks and Asset Portfolio 
In this section, we examine how natural hazard risks affect a household’s asset portfolio. In theory, the 
importance of ex-ante actions in determining portfolio allocation among different assets depends on the 
perceived future risks of disasters, and the likelihood of receiving public assistance. Here, we compute 
disaster risk using actual realizations of disasters that took place between the initial and final survey 
rounds. In the case of Bangladesh, we compute the probability of floods during 1998–2004. For Ethiopia 
and Malawi, we compute the risk for drought during 1999–2004 and 2000–2004, respectively. The 1998 
flood in Bangladesh was a single severe incident for many households in the sample; as noted earlier, 




extended duration is extremely unlikely. In Ethiopia and Malawi, droughts occurred rather frequently in 
our sample villages.  
As discussed in Section 3, we focus on maximum education in the household, and livestock value 
relative to land. The literature and our previous results suggest that bullocks can cushion negative income 
shocks, since farmers can sell or use them as collateral. In contrast, transactions in land markets are 
relatively uncommon, owing to the imperfection (or lack of) land markets in the studied countries. 
Educated household members are more mobile and the returns to schooling are not directly correlated 
with farm income fluctuations caused by floods and/or droughts.  
The roles of assets in mitigating disaster impacts (as discussed in the previous section) are 
thought to be associated with ex-ante asset allocation. For example, if human capital in the household is 
important for reducing disaster shocks, individuals have an incentive to invest in and hold human capital 
prior to disasters. This incentive must be higher if the future disaster risk is larger.  
Table 10 summarizes our estimation results from the three countries. The probability of drought 
or flood is estimated from the incidences during the period from the initial to final survey rounds, and we 
take the average of the estimates within a given village. This method reduces idiosyncratic errors. In the 
estimation below, we control for land effect, as human capital stock (measured by maximum education) 
and livestock are usually positively correlated with total asset holdings (here proxied by land size). The 
future disaster risk estimates are interacted with landholding. 
Columns 1 through 4 show our results for the Bangladesh data set. In all columns, land has a 
significant positive effect on maximum years of education and cattle value. In the interaction terms with 
landholding in Columns 1 and 2, the effect of flood probability on maximum years of education is 
convex. We see a threshold probability above which the flood probability increases the maximum years of 
education in the household (0.082 in Column 1 and 0.074 in Column 2). For the value of cattle, we do not 
find any jointly significant effects.  
In Ethiopia, we do not find any significant effects on maximum years of education. In contrast, 
Columns 7 and 8 show that the value of cattle increases with the probability of drought above a threshold 
probability (0.189 in Column 7 and 0.159 in Column 8).  
In Malawi, we see evidence for threshold probabilities above which the probability of drought 
significantly increases the maximum years of education (thresholds of 0.238 in Column 9 and 0.123 in 
Column 10) and the value of cattle (0.248 in Column 12).  
The above finding is theoretically interesting, especially since the threshold probabilities are 
relatively small. The environment of no disaster risk seems to encourage investments in human capital 
and livestock. However, as the disaster risk increases, precautionary motives to invest in assets with the 
expectation of future disaster will offset the risk-aversion effect. In the environment in our sample, the 
incentive to hold human capital (Bangladesh and Malawi) and livestock (Ethiopia and Malawi) is positive 
across a reasonable range of future disaster probabilities.   
Interestingly, the above findings are consistent with our earlier findings on the risk-mitigating 
effects of household education. In Bangladesh (Tables 3b and 4) and Malawi (Table 6), we see that 
maximum education significantly mitigates the negative impact of flood and drought, respectively, on 
schooling investment. For Ethiopia (Table 5) we do not find a significant effect for maximum education. 
Therefore, the positive association between pre-disaster household human capital and the future risk of 




Table 10.  Asset portfolio prior to disaster 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 













education  Cattle  Cattle 
Disaster probability  28.54    20,650.8      1.183    -17,157.4      -19.10    100,788.7   
  (1.76)    (0.58)      (0.07)    (3.38)      (3.28)    (1.10)   
Squared probability  -172.55    -26,499.9      -11.20    45,430.8      40.08    -183,276.6   
  (1.50)    (0.14)      (0.17)    (1.93)      (3.35)    (0.93)   
Land  0.019  0.0134  66.21  57.99    0.3508  0.3650  1,026.9  1,361.1    -0.079  205,023  8,953.3  7,492.4 
  (3.76)  (4.49)  (2.93)  (3.71)    (1.67)  (3.23)  (4.35)  (5.55)    (0.68)  (2.00)  (2.62)  (2.82) 
Land × disaster probability  -0.267  -0.134  -875.10  -711.15    -0.775  1.170  -7,060.6  -12,979.2    1.781  -1.323  -70,400.7  -55,855.5 
  (2.13)  (1.82)  (1.66)  (1.95)    (0.38)  (0.10)  (0.89)  (1.97)    (1.11)  (1.19)  (1.85)  (1.91) 
Land × squared probability  1.633  0.908  3,061.12  2,408.45    -7.730  -17.39  25,910.3  40,762.7    -1.471  5.382  139,949.3  112,502 
  (1.51)  (1.86)  (1.28)  (1.14)    (0.69)  (0.39)  (0.89)  (1.83)    (0.35)  (2.12)  (1.49)  (1.53) 
Number of observations  603  603  602  602    1,361  1,361  1,376  1,376    636  636  664  664 
Number of thana  7  7  7  7                     
Number of regions            4  4  4  4    4  4  4  4 
R-squared (within)  0.1721  0.1666  0.2516  0.2462    0.0464  0.0438  0.1691  0.1575    0.0559  0.0422  0.2105  0.2003 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values obtained using robust standard errors with thana clusters (Bangladesh) and region clusters (Ethiopia and Malawi). Disaster probability 








6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper uses panel data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Malawi to examine the impacts of natural 
disasters on schooling investments, emphasizing the roles of ex-ante actions and ex-post responses. We 
find that the importance of ex-ante actions depends on the disaster risks and the likelihood of public 
assistance.  
Our empirical results show that there is an interesting heterogeneity in asset portfolios as well as 
in ex-ante and ex-post responses. In Bangladesh and Malawi, a higher future disaster probability increases 
the likelihood of an agent holding more human capital relative to land. However, in Ethiopia, investments 
in human capital are not systematically related to future disaster probabilities. The likelihood of holding 
livestock is positively associated with a higher probability of drought in Ethiopia and Malawi.  
In all cases, we observe an interesting nonlinearity, namely that the effect of future disaster risk 
on asset holding becomes positive when the disaster probability goes above a (relatively small) threshold. 
There seem to be two offsetting effects of disaster risk: future risk discourages investment by making 
returns uncertain, but it encourages investments toward mitigating disaster impacts. In disaster-prone 
areas, the latter effect offsets the former.  
Our results confirm that both ex-ante private and ex-post public responses, working mostly 
through emergency assistance programs in the latter case, help mitigate disaster impacts. However, the 
balance between ex-ante and ex-post actions varies across countries. 
In Ethiopia, public assistance plays a more important role than ex-ante actions in mitigating the 
shocks on child schooling. In contrast, Malawi relies on private ex-ante actions, while the utility of public 
assistance is, by and large, insignificant. The Bangladesh example shows active roles for both ex-ante and 
ex-post actions. Interestingly, these observations are consistent with our findings on the relationship 
between ex-ante actions and disaster risk.  
These results have important implications for the design of public safety net policies, and raise 
several questions that deserve further investigation. For example, are ex-post actions unimportant in 
Malawi owing to the ineffectiveness of this country’s public assistance scheme? Is the importance of ex-
post public assistance in Ethiopia correlated with better program effectiveness (in terms of emergency 
assistance targeting) and/or the greater difficulties faced by poor Ethiopian households in undertaking ex-
ante risk-mitigating actions? Finally, in Bangladesh, do different types of households benefit differently 
from ex-post and ex-ante actions, with wealthier households better able to undertake ex-ante actions, 
while poorer households benefit more from well-targeted emergency assistance?  
All in all, our results show that among the studied ex-ante actions, the accumulation of human 
capital within the household prior to disasters helps mitigate the negative effects of disasters in both the 
short and long runs. Our results suggest that disaster-prone countries should strengthen their efforts to 
increase investment in human capital in order to mitigate disaster impacts (that is, income variance), 
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